CAUTION ON AFGHANISTAN, FROM A REAL EXPERT - AT 8:02 A.M. ET:  The following letter comes from an American who travels to Afghanistan and is a recognized expert on the country's current condition.  This is not an optimistic report:

At the risk of melodrama, I think the administration has reached a very real crossroads on Afghanistan.  I note that in some conservative circles George Will is getting roundly dunned for his recent piece on Afghanistan, but some of his points are spot on.
 
He writes:
 
"NATO assistance is reluctant and often risible." 
 
Will has been criticized for not crediting the valiant efforts by some NATO partners (especially the British), but he brushes up against a bigger point here.  NATO "assistance" suggests that they are just helping out, lending a hand to a largely American endeavor.  This would be fine, except for the out-of-proportion influence NATO countries have at the headquarters level.  Prickly NATO leaders expect to consulted at every turn and hint at political fallout when their paltry contributions don't merit heavy consideration of their positions.  I don't know if McChrystal has changed the atmospherics much at ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) headquarters, but I'd be surprised if he's had much of an impact on that culture.  After all, senior NATO officials have little to fear from him...their bread is buttered elsewhere.  This leads to a lack of the much vaunted and extremely necessary "unity of effort" that military operations require.  Yes, we have succeeded without it before, but only when we were able to bring our decided advantage in firepower and logistics to bear; these advantages mean much less in a counterinsurgency.
 
"Counterinsurgency doctrine teaches, not very helpfully, that development depends on security, and that security depends on development." 
 
I've seen or heard nothing to give one hope that any signficant development will be forthcoming in this backward region.  It manufactures almost nothing and its only cash crop is heroin.  The work of our military is heroic, but can only produce drops of progress in oceans of stasis.  We are not rebuilding in Afghanistan, we are building in Afghanistan.  This building is proceeding very slowly, far too slowly to have any impact whatsover on security levels. 

Also, Afghan businessman and government officials are being advised by Eurocrats who have no idea how to unleash the untapped potential of capitalism.  They are excellent in helping slow and hinder healthy economies, but in jump-starting new ones?  I wonder if they have any idea what to do.  "Jobs programs" and "investing in the community" sound great, but what do they mean on the ground?  The Afghans actually spent time, money, and security on hosting a "women in business" conference, the perfect sort of high-minded and utterly useless event the Eurocrats are good at running.
 
"Counterinsurgency theory concerning the time and the ratio of forces required to protect the population indicates that, nationwide, Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is inconceivable." 
 
This is the crux of the problem.  For counterinsurgency to work, the people have to feel secure enough to rat out the bad guys.  They will never rat them out while they move freely among them.  And the bad guys will roam freely among them throughout most of Afghanistan in the absence of a huge expansion of our efforts there.  Further NATO assistance is not coming.  A rapid expansion of the Afghan security forces, both Army and police, would probably produce poor results.  Despite our Herculean efforts, the current Afghan forces are marginal at best.  A rapid increase in their ranks would fatally weaken the current structure, overburdening stretched recruiting, training, logistics, and command and control systems.  The Afghan army is made up of valiant men who have no concept of management, planning or fiscal responsibility.  At this point, training Afghan forces burdens our forces there; it does not add significant counterinsurgency strength to the field.
 
It is an open secret that McChrystal needs many, many more troops for security forces, but has been warned by Washington to NOT bring in an assessment that requires them.  It will be interesting to see if he has the courage to bring the bad news that, without rapid expansion, we will continue to make no significant progress--which is the same as losing in a counterinsurgency.
 
"America should do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent Special Forces units, concentrating on the porous 1,500-mile border with Pakistan, a nation that actually matters."
 
This is pure fantasy.  Small, potent Special Forces do not drop in from afar without the kind of intelligence that being present on the battlefield produces or without having the tremendous logistical, medical, and air support that a signficant presence in theater provides.   Afghans cannot supply any of these, and would not if they could, if we are not there fighting with them.  Similarly, drones, cruise missiles, and air strikes will fall uselessly on empty patches without eyes on the ground in theater.  Pakistan's porous 1500-mile border will be that much more unpoliced if there is no one there to police it.
 
No, we cannot do anything about Afghanistan from afar.  It is so remote, so splintered, so inhospitable that we are forced to be either all in or all out.  Neither prospect is encouraging, but doing a slight bit more of the same, which seems to be what Obama wanted to hear, cannot work.

COMMENT:  We have an administration that believes itself too sophisticated to use the word "victory," and we apparently are paying the price.  Some say Afghanistan will become Obama's Vietnam.  It could be worse.  We could be left with an Afghanistan that still harbors and nurtures those who attacked us on 9-11, and dream of doing it again, on a larger scale.

September 3, 2009